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Reputation or Registration: Which Prevails? Taylor v Killer Queen, LLC [2026] HCA 5.

Background

Ms Katie Perry (Designer) registered her fashion label ‘KATIE PERRY’ on 12 April 2007 under class 42 for ‘clothing and fashion designing’. On 29 September, the Designer applied to be the registered owner of her trade mark.

Ms Katheryn Hudson (Singer) emerged as a public figure in late 2007 upon the release of her single ‘Ur So Gay’. During June 2008, Ms Hudson released her second album ‘One of the Boys’, containing singles ranked on international music charts. In July 2008, Mr Jensen on behalf of a talent agency which managed Ms Hudson’s career, began considering branded merchandise to sell in Australia, among other countries. On 11 and 16 September 2008, the first and second of Ms Hudson’s t-shirt concepts were approved, respectively. Subsequently, her online store became active around October 2008. There was extensive publicity and coverage of her intended, and subsequent visits to Australia in late 2008.

On 24 October 2019, the Designer commenced proceedings in the Federal Court alleging that the respondent’s merchandise bore the Singers mark infringing the Designer’s mark.

On 20 December 2019, Ms Hudson filed a cross-claim seeking rectification of the Register by cancelling the Designer’s mark.

 

Relevant provisions

Trade Marks Act

Section 88

  • Subject to subsection (2) and section 89, a prescribed court may, on the application of an aggrieved person or the Registrar, order that the Register be rectified by:
  • Cancelling the registration of a trade mark; or
  • Removing or amending an entry wrongly made or remaining on the Register; or
  • Entering any condition or limitation affecting the registration if a trade mark that ought to be entered

 

  • An application may be made on any of the following grounds, and on no other grounds:
  • Any of the grounds on which the registration of the trade mark could have been opposed under this Act;
  • An amendment of the application for the registration of the trade mark was obtained as a result of fraud, false suggestion or misrepresentation;
  • Because of the circumstances applying at the time when the application for rectification is filed, the use of the trade mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion;
  • If the application is in respect of an entry in the Register – the entry was made, or has been previously amended, as a result of fraud, false suggestion or misrepresentation.

 

Section 60

The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:

  • Another trade mark had, before the priority date for the registration of the first-mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, acquired a reputation in Australia; and
  • Because of the reputation of that trade mark, the use of the first-mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.

 

Section 89

  • The court may decide not to grant an application for rectification made:

(b) on the ground that the trade mark is liable to deceive or confuse (a ground on which its registration could have been opposed)

(c) On the ground referred to in paragraph 88(2)(c)

if the registered owner of the trade mark satisfies the court that the ground relied on by the applicant has not arisen through any act or fault of the registered owner.

 

  1. Reputation of prior mark

Enquiry under 60(a)

The High Court identified that the question posed by 60(a) is whether the singer’s trademark had, before the priority date for the registration of the designer’s mark, acquired a reputation in Australia.

The primary judge found that Ms Hudson’s mark had acquired a reputation in Australia before the Priority date under music and entertainment.

However, the High Court opposed the primary judge’s finding on the basis that the ‘common practice’ of singers selling merchandise in the course of undertaking entertainment and performances did not create a segue through which the mark’s reputation under music and entertainment acquired a reputation under clothing before the priority date. This finding was informed by –

  • As at the priority date, the recognition of the Singer’s mark was in relation to music and entertainment
  • Ms Hudson’s online merchandise store had not yet launched, negating findings that the singer’s mark was recognised by the public generally in relation to clothing.

It was concluded that although such reputation existed, it was confined to the service of ‘entertainment’ and the goods of ‘recording discs’.

 

  1. Confusion or deception

The High court had regard to both approaches under the TM act, namely –

  1. Section 88(2)(a) read in tandem with Section 60(b)
  2. Section 88(2)(c)

 

First approach: Section 88(2)(a) read in tandem with Section 60(b)

  • The threshold for deception and confusion is high – there must be a ‘real, tangible danger of deception or confusion’. A mere possibility is not sufficient.
  • The question whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion is to be answered not by reference to the actual use to which the owner has employed the mark, but the ‘notional, normal and fair use’ – a spectrum of all uses to which the mark could be employed.

Application

Having determined, under 60(a), that the singer’s mark had only acquired a reputation in respect of entertainment and recording discs, the relevant question for determination is whether the notional and fair use of the designer’s mark within the ambit permitted under class 25 of registration would likely deceive or cause confusion.

Considering the spectrum of all permissible uses to which the designer’s mark could be employed, the High Court considered that, as clothing of the nature commonly sold by pop stars was well within the breadth of the specified goods and services granted to Ms Taylor through registration of her trade mark under class 25, a likelihood of deception and confusion did exist under the ‘notional, normal and fair use’ of the Designer’s mark.

However, the High court narrowed this approach  to that of what could have realistically given rise to confusion as to whether the two marks were affiliated before the priority date. Put differently, Jagot J considered that the notional use did not extend to improper or illegitimate uses, or use in bad faith, of which would include the use of the designer’s mark in conjunction with an image of Katy Perry or another feature associated with her character as a pop star. Under the same line of reasoning, Gleeson J identified that an ordinary consumer for clothes would be aware that a pop star may seek to enhance the reputation of their mark by merchandising clothes. Consequently, consumers of clothing bearing the designer’s mark, upon considering the possibility of affiliation with the singer’s mark, would notice the absence of any other feature – an image of the singer, the name of a song or album released by the singer, a list of details of a concert tour.

Relevantly, Gleeson J continued to consider that the pop star’s mark was acquire only shortly before the priority date. This substantiates the conclusion found under the approach above – it is unlikely that an ordinary person may think that Katy Perry had launched merchandise in the short period after the pop star’s reputation was acquired and was still developing, without prominently associating herself with the label, consistent with her character as a pop star.

Thus, an order for rectification of the register could not be satisfied on this basis.

 

Second approach: Section 88(2)(c)

Under this approach, the inquiry as to the cause of the likely deception or confusion is broader – it can apply more generally as at the date of the application for the rectification of the register. This broader approach warranted additional considerations from each Judge forming the majority.

  1. Gleeson J

The broader approach under section 88(2)(c) enabled Gleeson J to consider the increased influence of the pop star’s mark, the increased presence of the pop star’s mark on clothing and shoes, and the actual use of each of the two marks after the priority date.

 

With these under consideration, Gleeson J concluded that there was no evidence of a real or tangible danger of confusion due to the long coexistence of the two marks without evidence of confusion, the distinct commercial spheres and contexts in which the marks would be encountered, and the large discrepancy in fame between the marks rendering any confusion as to connection not likely.

 

 

  1. Steward J

 

The broader approach under section 88(2)(c) enabled Steward J to consider the presumption against reward the assiduous infringer based on the longstanding principle that no one shall gain an advantage from his own wrong. With application to trade mark infringement, a trader who uses a registered trademark to such an extent that the use of the trademark by the proprietor of the mark would likely deceive and cause confusion cannot effect the invalidity of the mark under the Act.

Therefore, the portion of deception or confusion caused by the conduct of the assiduous infringer is not considered. To do so would be to breach the maxim.

As Steward J considered that the whole of the deception and confusion emanated from the conduct of the respondents, an order for rectification of the register would fail on this basis.

 

 

  1. Jagot J

The broader approach under section 88(2)(c) enabled Jagot J to consider the context surrounding the use of the designer’s mark.

The following facts were considered:

  • Ms Taylor maintained a database of contacts whom she frequently updated about her ‘Katie Perry’ clothing
  • Ms Taylor sold her ‘Katie Perry’ clothing at Paddington Markets for seven years
  • Ms Taylor sold her ‘Katie Perry’ clothing from a showroom in Mosman

These trade avenues characterise the notional use of the ‘Katie Perry’ trade mark in respect of goods within class 25. The characteristics of small scale trade and visual identity (as opposed to aural identity) can be inferred from these trade avenues.

Thus, the strength of the ‘Katy Perry’ trademark as opposed to the limited scale of the ‘Katie Perry’ trademark could support a conclusion that deception and confusion is not likely.

 

The appeal was upheld.